The world macro saving fact concerns the total financial saving of the world's private sector divided by world GDP. Relative to changes before 1994, there was a huge fall in this ratio between
Introduction
This paper shows that there have been huge fluctuations in the world private saving rate since 1995 relative to the size of prior fluctuations. It also shows that these fluctuations are highly correlated with fluctuations in world stock and housing prices. It thus appears that much of the variation in the world private saving rate then presents a possible explanation.
The fact concerns financial saving-flows of funds among sectors and countries. Financial saving does not distinguish between consumption and investment expenditures. The financial saving of a sector or country is total revenue minus total expenditures, including expenditures that are classified in the national income and product accounts as investment expenditures. 1 In the GDP definition
where Y is GDP, C is consumption, I is investment, G is government spending, EX is the level of exports, and IM is the level of imports, S as used in this paper is Y − C − I − G, namely the country's current account, EX − IM . A country's saving, on the other hand, which will be denoted SAV , is Y − C − G, so S = SAV − I. In this paper SAV will be called "saving,"
and S, SP , and SG will be called "financial saving."
Much of the literature on saving behavior is concerned with SAV . It is important to realize that a country's current account (S) can be large relative to its GDP even though it has a low saving rate (because I is small). If one is talking about which countries are financing, say, a large U.S. current account deficit, it is not necessarily countries with high saving rates. By definition all current account deficits are financed by current account surpluses (because the sum of S across countries is zero), but this in itself says nothing about which countries have high saving rates and which have low saving rates. Bernanke's speech is in fact not really concerned with a global saving glut, but
with the large U.S. current account deficit. He discusses a number of possible reasons for the large U.S. deficit and for the surpluses of some other countries.
None of this discussion requires the concept of a global saving glut.
Obstfeld ( This paper is not concerned with current account imbalances. Instead, the world is divided into two sectors-private and government-and the financial saving of the world's private sector is examined, not the financial flows among countries.
There is an interesting literature showing that after taking into account capital gains and losses on net foreign assets, the change in a country's net foreign assets can be quite different from the country's current account-see, for example, Gourinchas and Rey (2007) and Obstfeld (2010) . The financial flow data used in this paper do not include capital gains and losses, so these valuation issues are not taken into account.
There is finally a literature explaining the private saving of various countries, both across time and across countries-see, for example, Maason, Bayoumi, and Samiei (1998) and Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Servén (2000). This latter ref-
erence provides a good summary of previous work. In this literature the private saving rate is regressed on a number of variables, generally using panel data sets.
Again, if the right hand side variables are exogenous, these regressions can be considered reduced form regressions. Government saving is usually one of the right hand side variables, which seems problematic. If, say, there is a negative shock to consumption, thus increasing private saving, this is likely to lead to a fall in output and income, which will lead to a fall in tax revenue and possibly an increase in some kinds of government spending. Government saving will thus fall.
Government saving is an endogenous variable, and it is not clear that it should be on the right hand side of an equation explaining private saving. At any rate, this
is not an issue in this paper. Total private financial saving in the world is equal to the negative of total government financial saving in the world, and the latter is certainly not a variable explaining the former.
The Data
Except for the asset data discussed in Section 4, all the data used in this paper were taken from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS). Only annual data were used. The current account for each country in U.S. dollars (S$) was taken to be (from the Balance of Payments section) the sum of 78ald (current account, n.i.e.) and 78bcd (capital account, n.i.e. Table 1 . In each group the countries are listed in the order they appear in the IFS data. What is of interest in this paper is the sum of SP $ across all countries divided by the sum of Y $, denoted sp * . As a check on the data, it is informative to look at the sum of S$ across all countries divided by the sum of Y $, denoted s * . This ratio should be zero, and it is of interest to see how far away from zero it is. sp * and s * are examined in the next section. Table 2 are dominated by the United States, and this can be seen by comparing Tables 2 and 3 . The values of s * in Table 3 are, of course, not expected to be zero because the United States is excluded from the sum.
As a check on the data, consider first in Table 2 Table 2 . The values in Table 2 are thus of roughly the same magnitude as 
Some Correlations
Before discussing a possible explanation of the fluctuations of sp * in Figure 1 , it will be useful to examine some correlations. Figure 3 plots sp * in Table 2 for set 1 (countries in group 1 including the United States) and the ratio of the S&P 500 stock price index to U.S. nominal GDP in billions, denoted S&P 500. It is clear from this figure that the two series are inversely correlated (regression results are presented later in this section).
Although sp * pertains to the entire world, whereas S&P 500 pertains only to the United States, it is the case that stock prices across many countries are highly positively correlated (Japan being an exception), and so S&P 500 can be considered to some extent to be a proxy for world stock prices. Figure 5 plots this index against S&P 500. The positive correlation is again evident. The timing is not quite as tight, which is due in part to the fact that the index is the end of year value and S&P 500 is the average for the year. Table 4 presents results of a regression of the change in sp * , ∆sp * , on the change in S&P 500, ∆S&P 500, and the change in P HOU SE, ∆P HOU SE, both current and lagged one year. The lagged values dominate the current values, and row 2 presents results using only the lagged values. The coefficeint estimates of ∆S&P 500 −1 and ∆P HOU SE −1 in row 2 are negative and highly significant.
The estimated standard error is 0.0051 (the range of sp * in Table 2 is −0.0224 to 0.0445). The R 2 is 0.82. A considerable amount of the variation in the change in sp * is thus explained by the previous year's changes in S&P 500 and P HOU SE.
This conclusion also holds if the United States is excluded from sp * , as can be seen in rows 3 and 4 in Table 4 .
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A Possible Explanation
The discussion up to this point has been atheoretical. A fact has been documented, and some correlations have been discussed. What is striking about the results is how much of the variance of the change in sp * has been explained in row 2 in Table 4 candidates. This is not to say that demographic variables, fiscal-policy variables, and interest rates have no effect on sp * . It's just that the fluctuations in sp * since 1995 seem too large for these effects to be the main story.
If one takes S&P 500 as a proxy for world stock prices and P HOU SE as a proxy for world housing prices, then the results in row 2 in Table 4 show that the world private saving rate is highly negatively correlated with world asset prices as measured by one-year-lagged values of stock prices and housing prices. It is difficult to test which of these theories is a better approximation of reality.
It is interesting that in Table 4 the one-year lagged changes dominate the currentyear changes. If the second theory is correct, one might expect the current-year changes to be more highly correlated with the change in sp * , since the expectation change affects both asset-price changes and consumption and investment changes at the same time. On the other hand, costs of adjustment could lead consumption 25 and investment changes to lag asset-price changes, and so the evidence in Table 4 in favor of the first theory is weak.
In the first theory the driving force behind changes in sp * is an unexpected change in asset prices, and in the second theory the driving force is an unexpected change the future values of some variable (like productivity). Because the correlation between sp * and world asset prices is so large, whatever driving force is at work, it is very important. It explains a large fraction of the variation in sp * . The contribution of this paper is showing that whatever force is operating, it changes world asset prices. Whether the force is such that asset prices change first, which then affect consumption and investment, or that asset prices and consumption and investment change at the same time is not something this paper needs to take a stand on.
The explanation offered here of the path of sp * in Figure 1 is thus that a large fraction of the variance of sp * is due to forces that change world stock prices and world housing prices.
This explanation is to some extent bad news for macroeconomic forecasters. Asset-price changes are essentially unpredictable, whether they are driven by changes in productivity expectations or some other force, and so much of the change in sp * is unpredictable. Much of the world macro economy is at the mercy of unpredictable forces.
This explanation is a "big picture" explanation. The present analysis is not a substitute for structural econometric modeling of the world economy. What the analysis suggests is that any structural model should account for the effects of the forces that change asset prices on aggregate demand. How this is modeled depends in part on which of the two theories discussed above one thinks is the best approximation of reality. The big picture that emerges from the present analysis is that the forces behind asset price changes are very important in influencing the world macro economy.
Judging Policy Makers
If the forces behind asset-price changes are unpredictable, this does not necessarily mean that policy makers have no ability to affect these changes. Take the huge boom in U.S. stock prices between 1995 and 2000. Many people thought at the time that this boom was a stock market bubble, but this did not appear to be the Fed's view. Alan Greenspan talked about a new age of productivity, and the Fed lowered interest rates during certain bad times in the stock market. 4 The view among many was that there was a "Greenspan put" regarding stock prices. It is possible that the Fed could have curtailed this boom by raising interest rates and margin requirements. Policy actions like these are themselves unpredictable, and thus changes in stock prices and housing prices can be unpredictable even though they are influenced by (unpredictable) policy actions.
Another example is the lack of much regulation of the U.S. housing market during the boom in housing prices between the late 1990s and 2006. Had there been more regulation, housing prices may not have risen as much as they did. The 4 Perhaps the most dramatic Fed action in this period was the surprise lowering of the federal funds rate on October 15, 1998. The U.S. stock market was down from its highs in late September, and the Fed cited unsettled conditions in financial markets as one of the reasons for the decrease. This resulted in a huge increase in stock prices after the announcement. Therefore, to the extent that the large fluctuations in sp * since 1995 are undesirable, policy actions or lack thereof may bear part of the blame.
